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THE CHILD EXCLUSION IN A GLOBAL
CONTEXT
Martha F. Davis
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Throughout its history, the United States' system for providing
subsistence support to families with children has reflected mixed
motives. Emerging from a patchwork of state "Mother's
Pension" programs, the federal Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program-part of the 1935 Social Security Act'was originally intended to support widowed mothers caring for
children in their homes. 2 The program was established as a
state-federal partnership. 3 However, state implementation varied
from the program's beginnings. In some states, the benefits were
systematically adjusted to encourage (or coerce) welfare recipients to
work in the fields during the harvest season. 4 In other instances, the
t Martha F. Davis is Associate Dean for Clinical and Experiential Education and
Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. She thanks Liz Dedrick, Melissa
Joyce, Ryan White and Noah Winkeler for research assistance during the preparation of this
Article.
I Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
301-1397jj (2006)). The program was originally named "Aid to Dependent Children" under
the 1935 Act, but it became "Aid to Families with Dependent Children" in 1962. See Pub. L.
No. 87-543, § 104(a)(3), 76 Stat. 172, 185 (1962). The addition of the term "Families" to the
program's name responded to concerns that the program discouraged marriage. Susan W. Blank
& Barbara B. Blum, A Brief History of Work Expectationsfor Welfare Mothers, 7 FUTURE
CHILD., Spring 1997, at 28, 31.
2 See Bums v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 582-83 (1975) (reviewing AFDC purposes); see
also 42 U.S.C. §601 (1994) (repealed 1996) (stating that AFDC provides financial assistance to
needy families "for the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their own
homes"). See generally WINIFRED BELL, AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN (1965)

(providing an overview of the program).
3 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968) (noting that "[tihe AFDC program is
based on a scheme of cooperative federalism"); see also Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 189
(1985) (describing the state-federal scheme of AFDC program).
4 See Joanne L. Goodwin, 'Employable Mothers' and 'Suitable Work': A Re-Evaluation
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subsistence welfare benefits were cut off in order to influence
mothers' choices about family structure, such as whether or not to
marry.5 As early as 1970, the United States Supreme Court approved
Maryland's program, which set an upper limit on welfare benefits
regardless of family size with the express purpose of, among other
things, "encouraging" low income people to engage in "family
planning." 6 The Maryland law-literally, a "family cap"--capped
benefits at the per capita level set for a family of six. 7 Under the
previously accepted practice nationwide, even large families had
been given an incremental benefit increase to reflect their greater
subsistence needs as additional children were born.
The use of welfare benefits to discourage childbearing by
low-income women gained new steam in the 1990s with the
introduction in Wisconsin of the "child exclusion," a variation on the
earlier family cap policy.9 In contrast to the general cap based on
family size, this scheme specifically targeted children born while
their families were on welfare. Under the policy, a family's benefit
levels were frozen based on its size at the time the household began
receiving welfare; any additional children born while the household
was receiving welfare benefits would not result in an incremental
increase in benefits.' 0 In effect, those after-born children would be
"excluded" from the calculation of household size. Like the earlier
family cap-and citing many of the same precedents-state laws of
this type were generally upheld by both state and federal courts."
The child exclusion was a key source of controversy during the
debate leading to the enactment of the 1996 welfare reform law,12 the

of Welfare and Wage-Earning for Women in the Twentieth-Century United States, 29 J. Soc.
HisT. 253, 261 (1995) (explaining that some states provided that women could be denied
benefits when field work was available).
See, e.g., King, 392 U.S. at 321-22 (describing "suitable home" provisions intended to
exclude the "unworthy" poor from the AFDC).
6 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (upholding a family cap that limited
benefits available to large families, in part to encourage family planning).
7 Id. at 509-10 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
8 See id. at 491-94 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing the congressional purpose
evinced by the legislative history of the Social Security Act).
9 See Lucy A. Williams, Essay, The Ideology of Division: BehaviorModification Welfare
Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 720 n.4 (1992) (discussing the Wisconsin "Family Cap
demonstration project," which denied additional benefits to children bom into families already
participating in AFDC).
10See Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and Welfare
'Reform,' 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 741, 755 (1993) (describing the family cap program).
1 See, e.g., C.K. v. N.J. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 194-95 (3d Cir.
1996); N.B. v. Sybinski, 724 N.E.2d 1103, 1110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Sojourner A. v. N.J.
Dep't of Human Servs., 828 A.2d 306, 317 (N.J. 2003).
2 See, e.g., David Steib, Note, Can "Family Values" Lift Americans Out of Poverty?, 9
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Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act.'3
As finally adopted, the 1996 welfare reform law repealed the
venerable Aid to Families with Dependent Children program,
replacing it with a new program, Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF). 14 The new approach to family welfare came with a
new set of statutory purposes that emphasized the role of welfare in
encouraging work, with mandatory work participation requirements
for welfare recipients.15 Yet even with these significant changes, the
first-listed purpose of TANF remained providing support to children
so that they could be raised in their own or a relative's home.16
In tension with this longstanding legislative goal, conservative
proponents of the child exclusion argued that the child exclusion
scheme should be a mandatory component of federal welfare policy,
with states required to adopt the approach in order to access federal
funds.17 An unlikely coalition of feminists and anti-choice religious
groups succeeded in defeating that proposal; they united around a
cluster of social justice issues, specifically their opposition to policies
that would increase child poverty and their shared concern that the
child exclusion scheme might unduly coerce low income women to
have more abortions.18

GEo. J. GENDER & L. 447, 455 (2008) ("During the debates on welfare reform, the Christian
Right and many right-wing think tanks lobbied for a federal family cap as a method of
dissuading women on welfare from having additional children out of wedlock.").
13 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
601-619 (2006)).
14 See id. The program was reauthorized, with some modifications, in 2005 with the
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4.
15 See PRWORA, § 601(a) (stating that the purposes of TANF are to: "(1) provide
assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in
the homes of relatives; (2) end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits
by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent and reduce the incidence of
out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing
the incidence of these pregnancies; and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of
two-parent families.").
16 Id.
" See, e.g., Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their Coercive Effects
and Damaging Consequences,29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 153 (2006) (discussing the House
of Representatives' initial welfare reform bill, which mandated a family cap); Steib, supra note
12, at 455 (discussing the conservative proponents' arguments for the family cap, including
"moral accountability" and "family values").
I8 See William Claibome, Reluctant Allies Oppose Clinton 'Family Cap' Welfare
Proposal,WASH. POST, May 27, 1994, at Al (discussing the plans of civil rights and religious
organizations to fight the child exclusion policy in federal court). There is some data to support
the predictions that brought this coalition to together. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. CAMASSO, FAMILY
CAPS, ABORTION, AND WOMEN OF COLOR 28-29 (2007) (finding a correlation between family
cap and abortion in New Jersey). But see Ted Joyce et al., Family Cap Provisionsand Changes
in Births and Abortions, 23 POPULATION RES. & POL'Y REV. 475, 503-44 (2004) (concluding
that there is little evidence of an independent effect of the family cap on childbirth and
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However, this federal victory was only half of the battle. Because
the federal welfare reform law was ultimately silent on the child
exclusion question, state legislatures were left to consider the
policy state by state as they implemented their new welfare reform
laws. Currently, twenty states utilize the child exclusion approach,
with some minor variations.' 9 In enacting these programs, state
legislatures have consistently cited the desire to constrain welfare
recipients' childbearing decisions. 20 For example, in support of the
New Jersey child exclusion, chief sponsor Wayne Bryant stressed
that by denying support, the measure "offer[s] parents a choice
regarding their decision to have another child while receiving public
assistance." 21 However, two states that originally adopted child
exclusion legislation-Illinois and Maryland-have since abandoned
the approach, finding it to be ineffective in achieving their state's
welfare policy goals.22
Many authors, both social scientists and legal scholars, have
examined the efficacy and legality of child exclusion policies.23 Legal

abortion).
1 See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Welfare Reform: Family Cap Policies,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16306 (last visited Aug. 31, 2010). Twenty states have
"child exclusion" programs that exclude children born to families while on welfare; two states
administer flat grants, extending the same benefits to every low income family, regardless of
size. Id.
20See, e.g., Sneed v. Saenz, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1220, 1230 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting that
the California child exclusion statute was partly "intended to promote personal responsibility
of welfare recipients by discouraging growth in family size while they received public
assistance"); N.B. v. Sybinski, 724 N.E.2d 1103, 1106-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) ("Indiana
hypothesized that the family cap would lead to a reduced childbirth rate. Specifically, the State
theorized that reduced fertility would lead to fewer children born into a dependent situation; an
increase in work; and more parent time per child."); see also Kelly J. Gastley, Note, Why Family
Cap Laws Just Aren't Getting It Done, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 390 (2004) ("By
discouraging women on TANF from having children they cannot financially support, the
presumption is that family cap laws will thereby decrease the incidence of out-of-wedlock births
among welfare recipients."); Stefanie Paige Underwood, Case Comment, C.K. v. New Jersey
Department of Health and Human Services: The War on Welfare Mothers, 18 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 343, 353 (1997) (noting that New Jersey's express purpose in enacting its child exclusion
law was "to discourage AFDC recipients from having additional children during the period of
their welfare dependence" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
21 CAMASSO, supra note 18, at 19.

22See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 19.
2 See, e.g., CAMASSO, supra note 18, at vii-viii (focusing research on the effect of the
family cap in New Jersey, the first state to implement this type of provision); ANNA MARIE
SMrTH, WELFARE REFORM AND SEXUAL REGULATION 6 (2007) (arguing that family cap

programs violate the traditional limits of state power); Susan Frelich Appleton, Essay, When
Welfare Reforms Promote Abortion: "Personal Responsibility," "Family Values," and the
Right to Choose, 85 GEO. L.J. 155, 158 (1996) (arguing that family caps not only impact
procreative decisions of the poor, but also express a value judgment on these issues); Yvette
Marie Barksdale, And the Poor Have Children: A Harm-Based Analysis of Family Caps and the
Hollow Procreative Rights of Welfare Beneficiaries, 14 LAW & INEQ. 1, 9 (1995) (questioning
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challenges have raised questions about the laws' constitutionality
under both state and federal constitutions, citing equal protection and
due process provisions, but as noted above, these challenges have met
24
with very limited success. Most courts considering the issue have
found the child exclusion policy to be constitutionally sound, holding
that the burden on women's childbearing decisions is minimal and
that the policy itself is rational.25
As a supplement to their constitutional claims, the petitioners
challenging the state's child exclusion law before a New Jersey state
court also included assertions of international human rights law
violations, presented in an amicus brief submitted by the Center
for Economic and Social Rights and other international advocacy
26
groups. Among other things, the amici argued that the child
exclusion policy discriminated against children on the basis of
birth status, in violation of the United States' obligations as a State
Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as
well as principles of customary law.27 The New Jersey Supreme

whether a government that provides a subsistence welfare program can legally exclude families
on the basis of their constitutionally protected procreative rights); Smith, supra note 17, at 152
(arguing family caps unconstitutionally coerce poor women into having abortions); Laura M.
Friedman, Comment, Family Cap and the UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine:Scrutinizing a
Welfare Woman's Right to Bear Children, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 637, 637-38 (1995) (arguing that
family caps are unconstitutional because they violate the guaranteed fundamental right to
reproduce); Christina E. Norland Audigier, Comment, Starving Five to Prevent the Birth of
One?: An InternationalHuman Rights Analysis of Child Exclusion Provisions and the Failure
of Federaland State ConstitutionalChallenges,77 TEMP. L. REV. 781, 784 (2004) (arguing that
the international human rights framework highlights flaws in child exclusion policies).
24 See, e.g., C.K. v. N.J. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 194-95 (3d Cir.
1996) (upholding the validity of New Jersey's child exclusion law under due process and equal
protection and affirming the district court's analysis of the law under a rational basis standard of
review); Sneed v. Saenz, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1220, 1248-51, 1249 (Ct. App. 2004) (upholding
California's child exclusion law on appeal using a rational basis test against arguments that it
violated the Equal Protection Clause and the plaintiffs' rights to privacy under the federal
Constitution, and noting that "[a]ny impact [of the law] on family living arrangements is
unintended, indirect and attenuated"); N.B. v. Sybinski, 724 N.E.2d 1103, 1108-13 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000) (affirming summary judgment, upholding the constitutionality of Indiana's child
exclusion law, and holding that: 1) the law had a rational basis, 2) the law did not impede
on parents' fundamental right of family association, and 3) the law did violate the Equal
Protection Clause or substantive due process under the federal and Indiana constitutions);
Gates v. Comm'r. of Transitional Assistance, No. 999-J-218 (Mass. App. Ct., May 3, 1999)
(Memorandum and Order), available at http://www.povertylaw.org/poverty-law-library/case/
52200/52294 (upholding the Massachusetts child exclusion law under a rational basis test).
2s See cases cited supra note 24.
26 See Amici Curiae Brief for the Center for Economic and Social Rights et al. in Support
of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 828 A.2d 306 (2003) (No.
A-2787-OOT5), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/sojourner-amicus.pdf.
27 See id. at 10-15.
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Court, however, found that the child exclusion was consistent with
both domestic and international legal standards.28
This Article continues to mine this territory by putting the child
exclusion, an American variation on population policies found around
the world, into a broader comparative context. This preliminary
survey indicates that while many nations, motivated by concerns
about limited national resources, have population policies intended to
support a woman's decision to forgo childbirth, a much smaller
number of countries craft these policies to target a particular
marginalized group.29 Further, when identifiable groups are targeted,
the programs are most often (though not always) shaped around
incentives rather than punitive measures intended to influence
behavior.30 In those instances where disincentives are employed, the
disincentives rarely, if ever, involve basic human needs such as food,
clothing or shelter.31
The distinction between disincentives and incentives is a
distinction with a difference. Many believe that mild incentives are
less morally problematic than disincentives. For example, the authors
of the popular book Nudge describe many small incentives that, they
argue, encourage "good" behavior without undermining individual
autonomy. 32 Similarly, economists David Bloom and David Canning
assert that while coercion should not be a part of a nation's family
planning scheme, "[p]opulation policies that attempt to change
fertility levels by incentives that affect desired fertility rather than
See Sojourner, 828 A.2d at 316-17.
See John A. Ross & Stephen L. Isaacs, Costs, Payments, and Incentives in Family
PlanningPrograms:A Review for Developing Countries,19 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 270,271 (1988)
(describing various policies offering incentives and disincentives to encourage use of
contraceptives); see also Jane Gilbert Mauldon, Providing Subsidies and Incentives for
Norplant, Sterilization and Other Contraception:Allowing Economic Theory to Inform Ethical
Analysis, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 351, 352 (2003) (pointing out the advantages of policies
that broadly offer contraception subsidies over current U.S. policy, which primarily targets
disadvantaged women).
30 Ushma D. Upadhyay, Informed Choice in Family Planning:Helping People Decide, in
POPULATION REPORTS, at 12-13 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Bloomberg Sch. of Pub. Health,
Population Info. Program, Series J, No. 50, Spring 2001), available at http://info.k4health.org/
pr/online.shtml#j.
31 See U.N. Secretariat, Dep't of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, Views and Policies Concerning
Population Growth and Fertility Among Governments in Intermediate Fertility Countries,
at 234 (2002), available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/completingfertility/
RevisedPOPDIVPPSpaper.PDF (noting that "many" countries use incentives and disincentives
to influence fertility levels, including restrictions on maternity leaves, limits on tax and
retirement benefits, and income-generating activities for those who accept family planning).
32 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 236 (2008) (describing, for example, the "dollar a day"
program in Greensboro, North Carolina that rewards teens for forgoing pregnancy). But see
Stephen L. Isaacs, Incentives, Population Policy, and Reproductive Rights: Ethical Issues, 26
STUD. FAM. PLAN. 363, 365 (1995) (noting the coercive effect of incentives).
2
29
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coercion of actual fertility or fixed family size targets allow families
to still achieve their goal by forgoing the incentive."33
Significantly, an approach that rejects narrow programs in favor of
policies with a population-wide impact is completely consistent with
the underlying purposes of the international human rights regime. If
nothing else, the modem human rights laws that emerged following
World War II are intended to prevent a recurrence of the genocide of
the Jews that marked the Nazi regime.34 For that reason, international
human rights law embodies a heightened concern regarding programs
that single out identifiable subgroups for punitive population control

measures. 35
Further, reflecting an emerging consensus concerning responsible
population policies, in 1994 the nations attending the International
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo
explicitly condemned the reliance on incentives and disincentives to
manipulate individual decisions concerning contraception and family
dn to the ICPD Programme of Action,
planning. 36 According
The principle of informed free choice is essential to the
long-term success of family-planning programmes. Any
form of coercion has no part to play. In every society there
are many social and economic incentives and disincentives
that affect individual decisions about child-bearing and
family size..

.

. Governmental goals for family planning

should be defined in terms of unmet needs for information
and services.
In other words, instead of incentives and disincentives, governments
are encouraged to utilize proactive educational measures to promote
broad-based engagement in family planning.38
33 David E. Bloom & David Canning, Population, Poverty Reduction, and the Cairo
Agenda, in REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE WAY FORWARD 51, 57 (Laura
Reichenbach & Mindy Jane Roseman eds., 2009) (emphasis added).
3 See, e.g., Kenneth Cmiel, The Recent History of Human Rights, 109 AM. HIST. REV.
117, 128-29 (2004), (discussing the international focus on the prevention of genocide following
World War II).
35See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 76, art. 25(2),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Ist plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) ("Motherhood and
childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of
wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.").
36 See Isaacs, supra note 32, at 364 ("The ICPD's Programme of Action condemned
coercion in family planning programs and lauded the principle of informed free choice.").
3 Int'l Conference on Population & Dev., Cairo, Egypt, Sept. 5-13, 1994, Programme of
Action, 7.12, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13/Rev.l (1995).
38See id. 7.22 (encouraging governments to meet population objectives "through
education and voluntary measures").
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When compared internationally with other population measures,
the child exclusion is an outlier because of the combination of
its narrow focus on a vulnerable population, its manipulation of
subsistence benefits, and its use of disincentives rather than
incentives.3 9 Compounding this confluence of troubling factors, the
child exclusion is a relatively ad-hoc, state-by-state program; it is not
a measure that was debated and adopted in the context of the
development of a more comprehensive national U.S. population
policy, and, even at the state level, it has not been incorporated into a
more general discussion of population policies.
Rather than allow the child exclusion to drift into an accepted
status quo of domestic law and policy, this relatively recent
innovation warrants continued skepticism and scrutiny as the
United States increasingly moves to implement international human
rights norms domestically. This Article first describes the U.S.
child exclusion policies more thoroughly. It then offers some global
analogues from other nations-China, India, and several African
nations-that have used government resources to pursue specific
national population goals. The third section sets out ethical principles
that have been proposed to guide governments considering these
policies, and examines a few of the existing policies from around the
world, including the child exclusion, in light of these principles. The
concluding section summarizes the serious questions about the child
exclusion policies raised by this global perspective.
II. THE CHILD EXCLUSION IN U.S. CONTEXT
In the absence of any coherent U.S. population policy, domestic
laws, policies, and programs intended to influence family size and
childbearing decisions have been adopted on a piecemeal basis,
some by the federal government and some by the states. The absence
of an overall framework and the resulting patchwork of policies
provide a haven for approaches of questionable moral underpinnings,
sometimes fueled by class, race, and gender bias, and often lacking
sound scientific basis.4 0 The child exclusion is one such policy.
3 According to some scholars, China is one of the very few nations that still pursues
punitive measures as a method of promoting family planning, in violation of international
human rights norms. See John Bongaarts & Stephen W. Sinding, Comment, A Response to
Critics of Family Planning Programs,35 INT'L PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH 39,
42 (2009) (recalling that human rights and women's health advocates were appalled by coercive
population control programs that emerged in China in the 1970s and 1980s).
40 For example, in 2004, California voters considered a statewide proposition to create a
Comprehensive Population Policy of the State of California. See Letter from Elizabeth G. Hill
& Donna Arduin, Cal. Legislative Analyst's Office, to Bill Lockyer, Attorney Gen., State of
Cal. 2-3 (May 4, 2004), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2004/040254.pdf. Some
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Child exclusion policies in the United States vary from state to
state. 4 1 For example, as a result of successful litigation in Nebraska,
welfare recipient mothers who are deemed unemployable due to a
lack of skills or disability are exempted from the program because
they do not, as a practical matter, have the option of working
to provide additional support for their additional children.42 In a
few other states, the exclusion is only partial-for example, in
Connecticut, excluded children born on welfare receive half of the
per child benefit generally given to larger families entering the
program.43
In every state with such a program, however, the child exclusion
targets only low income families receiving federal welfare benefits.
Welfare recipients are, by definition, extremely poor." As a matter of
state policy reflected across the country, income eligibility for welfare
support is pegged at a fraction of the federal poverty line, with some
states more generous than others within this below-subsistence
framework. 45 Thus, it is only the very low-income, most economically
vulnerable families that are subject to the child exclusion program.
Families with greater resources face an entirely different scheme. In
contrast to the child exclusion's effort to use government funds
to discourage low-income welfare recipients from childbirth, the

supporters of this measure were motivated by the desire to restrict immigration by denying basic
services to undocumented aliens. See id. In earlier times, eugenics laws were common on the
state level. See Michael G. Silver, Note, Eugenics and Compulsory Sterilization Laws:
Providing Redress for Victims of a Shamefid Era in United States History, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 862, 863 (2004) (recounting that over 60,000 individuals were sterilized under various
states' laws in the early twentieth century).
41 See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 19 (indicating states in which
traditional cash increments for additional children have been denied).
42 See Mason v. State, 672 N.W.2d 28, 36 (Neb. 2003) (upholding the state's family cap
exclusion of those who are "incapable of self-sufficiency" from the program).
43 See State of Connecticut Department of Social Services, Welfare Reform - Family Cap,
http://www.ct.gov/dss/cwp/view.asp?a=2353&q=305274 (last visited Aug. 31, 2010) ("Only
$50 is added to the parent's cash assistance payment when a newborn child is added to the
award. This is one-half the average of what a family received under previous policy.").
I For example, in Massachusetts, a family loses its eligibility for welfare when its
total assets exceed $2,500. See MassResources.org, TAFDC: Financial Eligibility, http:l
www.massresources.org/pages.cfm?contentlD-17&pagelD-4&subpages=yes&dynamiclD-349
(last visited Aug. 31, 2010).
45 See COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REP., 108TH CONG., 2004 GREEN
BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 7-48 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 GREEN BOOK], available

at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname-108_green_book&docid=f:wmO
06.07.pdf (describing state phase-out points for welfare support); see also LEGAL MOMENTUM,
THE BITTER FRUIT OF WELFARE REFORM: A SHARP DROP IN THE PERCENTAGE OF ELIGIBLE

WOMEN AND CHILDREN RECEIVING WELFARE 2 (2009), http://www.legalmomentum.org/
assets/pdfs/Im-tanf-bitter-fruit.pdf (noting that "the average state of financial eligibility standard
has declined to [only] 29% of the official poverty level").
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federal tax system provides incrementally increasing support to
higher income families that choose to have additional children.4 6 For
example, those families may access the federal child care tax credit
and take an additional child tax credit for each dependent child, as
well as claim the child as a dependent and take advantage of any state
level tax breaks.47
Beyond the income-based targeting, however, there is also a
race-based aspect to the child exclusion. Because African Americans
are disproportionately poor, families and children affected by the
child exclusion are disproportionately African American. 48 While
this disparate impact may appear at first blush to be a byproduct of a
neutral policy choice, there is some evidence that these families have
been intentionally targeted. At least one study has demonstrated that
states with higher African American populations were more likely
to adopt the child exclusion policy, along with other limitations on
cash assistance.49 Statements of state legislators supporting the child
exclusion policy also suggest that the policies have been adopted
because of, not in spite of, their racial impacts.50
This confluence of harsh policy impacts, with the denial of
subsistence support falling hardest on low-income African-American
children and their families, positions the child exclusion policies
adopted by two-fifths of the states as a unique program globally---one
that should trigger particular concern given the underlying principles
of the international human rights regime.

46 This has at times provoked some controversy, since it encourages taxpayers to have "as
many [children] as possible." Dalton Conley, Two Is Enough, SLATE, Mar. 29, 2004,
http://www.slate.com/id/2097913/ (arguing that subsidizing children through the tax system is
an outdated policy reflecting industrial-age norms).
4 See Elaine Maag, Credits and Exemptions for Children, TAX NOTES, Sept. 28, 2009,
at 1, available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001331 credits-children.pdf
(discussing tax credits and exemptions available for families with dependent children); see also
Oregon Employment Department - Child Care Division, Tax Credits, http://www.oregon.gov
/EMPLOY/CCD/taxcredits.shtml (last visited Aug. 31, 2010) (describing state level tax credits).
" See generally Joe Soss et al., Setting the Terms of Relief: Explaining State Policy
Choices in the Devolution Revolution, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 378 (2001) (discussing the family
cap, time limits, and work requirements for welfare recipients).
49 Thomas Gais & R. Kent Weaver, State Policy Choices Under Welfare Reform, in

WELFARE REFORM & BEYOND POLICY BRIEF, at 5-6 (Brookings Inst., Policy Brief No. 21, Apr.

2002) available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2002/04welfare-gais/pb
21.pdf
5 See, e.g., CAMASSO, supra note 18, at 18 (citing a white New Jersey legislator who
thanked Wayne Bryant, an African-American, for promoting this issue); see also Henry A.
Freedman, The Welfare Advocate's Challenge: Fighting Historic Racism in the New Welfare
System, 36 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 31, 33 (2002) (noting that "[s]tates with larger minority
populations [receiving benefits] tend to have harsher sanctions, time-limit, and family cap
policies").
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III. THE CHILD EXCLUSION INGLOBAL CONTEXT
Globally, many nations-though not the United States-have
explicit population policies intended to rationalize their overall
approach to population growth and to influence their general
populations to make childbirth choices that will further national
goals of conserving resources, managing infrastructure and, in some
instances, promoting sustainability.5 ' Between 1960 and 1992, the
number of countries adopting national population policies rose from 3
to 77; by the end of the 1990s, the number had increased to 114.52 I
many instances, these national policies were developed in response to
positions adopted by the United Nations and other international
bodies linking reductions in fertility growth with economic
development.
In countries with a federal structure, sub-national governments
have also sometimes adopted initiatives intended to implement
these policies on a regional or local level.54 Indonesia's national
population policy, for example, has been operationalized on a
regional level. 5 Similarly, individual states in India have adopted
their own comprehensive population policies, coordinating them with
the country's overarching policy.56

5' See U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Div., World Population Policies
2007, at 12-14, U.N. Doc. STIESA/SER.A/272 (2008), available at http://www.un.org/esa
/population/publications/wpp2007/Publication-introduction.pdf (discussing fertility and family
planning policies in geographic regions including Africa, Eastern Europe and Western Europe).
France, for example, has aggressively adopted pro-natalist policies to counteract a declining
fertility rate. See, e.g., JONATHAN GRANT ET AL., Low FERTILITY AND POPULATION AGEING:
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY OPTIONS 70 (2004), available at http://www.rand.org

/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND..MG206.pdf (discussing the policy steps taken by France to
encourage immigration and increase fertility).
52 Deborah Barrett & Amy Ong Tsui, Policy as Symbolic Statement: International
Responses to National PopulationPolicies, 78 SoC. FORCES 213, 215 (1999).
5 Id. at 214-15; see also Rachel Sullivan, The Politics of Population Policy Adoption in
Sub-Saharan Africa: Global Intersections with Demographic Localities 6-7 (Jan. 18, 2006)
(unpublished

paper),

available at

http://www.allacademic.com/meta/pl05081_index.html

(discussing the role of international organizations in the adoption of population policies by
individual nations).
5 See, e.g., BADRI N. SAXENA, CHARAN D. WADHRA & O.P. SHARMA, POPULATION
POLICY OF INDIA: IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES AT NATIONAL AND STATE LEVELS (2004)

(describing population policies in four sub-national districts).
55 See Gavin W. Jones, Sub-NationalPopulation Policy: The Case of North Sulawesi, 25
BULL. INDONESIAN ECON. STUD. 77 (1989) (examining Indonesia's population policy within a
provincial context).
56 See, e.g., GOv'T OF UTrAR PRADESH, POPULATION POLICY OF UTTAR PRADESH (2000),
available at http://www.policyproject.com/pubs/countryreportsfINDUP-pp.pdf; Directorate of

Health Services, Government of Goa, Draft Population Policy (March 2007), available at
http://goagovt.nic.in/GoaPPp.doc; see also Asok Mitra, Note, National Population Policy in
Relation to NationalPlanning in India, 3 POPULATION & DEv. REV. 297, 297-99 (1977).
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Finally, in more recent years, many countries have explicitly
adopted approaches that conform to the terms of the 1995 Beijing
which reiterated that
Declaration and Platform for Action,
that
fundamental human
recognize
treaties
rights
human
international
rights include the right of all couples and individuals
to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and
timing of their children and to have the information
and means to do so, and the right to attain the highest
standard of sexual and reproductive health. It also includes
their right to make decisions concerning reproduction free
of discrimination, coercion and violence, as expressed in
human rights documents. In the exercise of this right,
they should take into account the needs of their living and
future children and their responsibilities towards the
community. The promotion of the responsible exercise of
these rights for all people should be the fundamental
basis for government- and community-supported policies and
programmes in the area of reproductive health, including
family planning.
To further contextualize the child exclusion approach and to provide
some comparative fodder, the discussion below reviews some other
nations' policies-reflecting both national and local implementation
efforts-that are relevant to this topic. It draws on case law,
government data, and other contextual information to illuminate their
purposes and effects.
A. India
India's National Commission on Population developed the nation's
first National Population Policy in 2000, building on a series of
earlier reports addressing the nation's population growth.59 At the
time of the 2000 policy, India's population was approaching one
5 Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, P.R.C., Sept. 4-15, 1995, Beijing
Declarationand PlatformforAction, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (Oct. 17, 1995).
58 Id. T 95. Nearly identical language conceming the number, timing and spacing of
children appears in Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, art. 16(1)(e), 1249
U.N.T.S. 13, 20 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW] (stating that all persons
have equal rights "to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children
and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these
rights").
5 See National Commission on Population, Government of India, National Population
Policy 2000 - Introduction, 3, http://populationcommission.nic.in/nppintro.htm.
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billion, or sixteen percent of the world's people.60 India has since
grown to approximately 1.16 billion people.61
According to the Population Commission's report, the National
Policy's objectives are:
to address the unmet needs for contraception, health care
infrastructure, and health personnel, and to provide integrated
service delivery for basic reproductive and child health
care; ... to bring

the

TFR

[Total

Fertility

Rate]

to

replacement levels by 2010, through vigorous implementation
of inter-sectoral operational strategies; [and] ... to achieve

a stable population by 2045, at a level consistent with
the requirements of sustainable economic growth, social
development, and environmental protection.62
Consistent with these goals, India's Population Commission proposed
adoption of a range of financial incentives for population control,
including rewards for couples below the poverty line who agree to
undergo sterilization, rewards for girls who delay childbirth until after
age nineteen, and rewards for couples who have their first child after
the mother turns twenty-one and who accept terminal birth control
after their second child.63
These measures were apparently recommended amid both
controversy and substantial reflection. Indeed, the National
Commission on Population prepared a special report, Incentives and
Disincentives to Promote the Small Family Norm, discussing the
"important ethical, administrative and political questions" raised by
incentive and disincentive programs. 4 After reviewing these various
questions, the Commission concluded:

6o Id.
61 See CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, India, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2010), availableat

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html.
62 National Commission on Population, Government of India, National Population Policy
2000 - Objectives, [ 1, http://populationcommission.nic.in/npp-obj.htm.
63 See National Commission on Population, Government of India, National Population
Policy 2000 - Funding, Promotional and Motivational Measures for Adoption of the Small
Family Norm, http://populationcommission.nic.in/npp-fun.htm#prom.
6 National Commission on Population, Government of India, Incentives and
Disincentives to Promote the Small Family Norm, 1 6, http://populationcommission.nic.in
/incentive.htm [hereinafter Incentives and Disincentives]. The report also lists the incentives and
disincentives employed in a number of Indian states. See id.; see also Sandhya Srinivasan,
Editorial, National Population Policy, INDIAN J. MED. ETHICS Apr.-June 2000, available
at http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/082ed039.html (reviewing ethical issues for medical
professionals posed by national population policy, including potential for coercion).
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While drafting laws and regulations and policies and
programmes relating to incentives and disincentives, above
discussed implications of incentives/disincentives should be
taken into consideration so as to make an appropriate balance
between rights of people and national goals for achieving
population stabilization.6 5
Though federal leadership provided a critical framework, much
of the policy's implementation has taken place on the local and
state level. In Javed v. State of Haryana,66 the Supreme Court of
India considered the legal parameters governing such local
implementation. 67
The case concerned a law adopted in the Indian state of Haryana
that denied membership in local Panchayats-the elected village-level
assemblies-to anyone having "more than two living children." 68 The
law was challenged as a violation of the Indian Constitution.69 Citing
specific provisions of the constitution, the petitioners argued that the
law was arbitrary and discriminatory, violative of personal liberty and
the freedom to have as many children as one chooses, and violative of
the freedom of religion.70
The Indian Supreme Court rejected these claims. Deferring to the
legislature on the specifics of the law, the court observed that
[o]ne of the objects sought to be achieved by the legislation is
popularizing the family welfare/family planning programme.
... The classification does not suffer from any arbitrariness.

The number of children, viz., two is based on legislative
wisdom. It could have been more or less. The number is a
matter of policy decision which is not open to judicial
scrutiny.
The court also situated the law in the context of more comprehensive
"gradual progressive change." 72 Thus, while the law targeted one
specific group of elected leaders, "[i]t would. . . [have been]

6s Incentives and Disincentives, supra note 64, 19; see also Mohan Rao & Devaki Jain,
National PopulationPolicy 2000: Re-examining CriticalIssues, 36 EcoN. & POL. WKLY. 1299,
1301 (2001) (warning that the elements of coercion are creeping into state-level programs).
6 A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 3057 (India).
67 See id. at 3062.
6 Id.
6 See id. at 3063.
70 See id.
71 Id. at 3064.
72 Id. at 3065.
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inexpedient and incorrect to think that all laws have to be made
uniformly applicable to all people in one go." 73
On the question of whether the law violated the fundamental rights
of Haryana's citizens, the court again examined the question in the
larger context of the nation's population policy. Citing extensive data,
the court concluded that "India is growing at [an] alarming rate." 7 4
Looking to its Asian neighbor, the court criticized China's response to
its own population explosion, in which "drastic disincentives were
cast on the couples breaching [the] 'one-child norm' which even
included penal action."" As the court observed approvingly, "India
being a democratic country has so far not chosen to go beyond casting
minimal disincentives and has not embarked upon penalizing
procreation of children beyond a particular limit."76 But, stated the
court, "[flundamental rights are not to be read in isolation."n Absent
population control, the Indian government could not adequately fulfill
its other obligations, including "promot[ing] the welfare of the people
and developing a social order empowered at distributive justicesocial, economic and political," nor could it take effective steps to
raise the nation's nutritional standards.7 8 Accordingly, because the
law reflected a necessary balancing of collective public imperatives,
the court concluded that the law did not violate any fundamental
individual liberty interest.79
The court similarly dealt with the claim based on religious
freedom. After a detailed review of various Muslim and Hindu
religious tenets, the court concluded that there was no fundamental
conflict between the law and any religious command.80
In sum, the Indian Supreme Court concluded that the state
legislature could appropriately require that members of the
Panchayats be examples for others in implementing the nation's
comprehensive family planning goals.8 ' Thus, the narrowly targeted
law was constitutional. Simply put by the court:
If anyone chooses to have more living children than two, he
is free to do so under the law as it stands now but then he
should pay a little price and that is of depriving himself from
73 Id.
74

Id. at 3068.

75

Id.

76

Id.

n Id. at 3069.

78Id. at 3070.
79

Id.

so See id. at 3070-73.
81 See id. at 3074.
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holding an office in panchayat in the State of Haryana. There
is nothing illegal about it and certainly no unconstitutionality
attaches to it.82
In the wake of this decision, several other Indian districts have
adopted similar bars on the family size of elected officials. 83 Other
disincentives adopted by several Indian districts to discourage large
families include the denial of maternity leave for local government
employees after the second child. 4
B. China
China's one-child policy is well-known. Adopted in 1979, the
policy was a response to the nation's population pressures as it
entered the era of a new baby boom.85 Though ostensibly a national
policy, it was applied unevenly by local governments.8 6 Strict
enforcement has been limited to urban populations, with rural
families sometimes permitted to have a second child five years after
the first, or sooner if the first child is a girl. Further, some ethnic
minorities are specially permitted to have up to three children.
When strictly enforced, the one-child policy features a range of
incentives and disincentives for compliance. Incentives include
special educational benefits for only children.89 Substantial fines and
even dismissal from work are among the most serious penalties for
failure to comply. 90 Many reports also indicate that forced abortion
and sterilization were part of China's implementation of the policy,
particularly in the 1980s. 9 1

82 Id. at 3073.

See Incentives and Disincentives, supra note 64.
See id.
See Therese Hesketh et al., The Effect of China's One-Child Family Policy After 25
Years, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1171, 1171 (2005) (noting that the Chinese government saw
the one-child policy as essential to relieving population pressures); see also Christie N. Love,
Not in Our Country? A Critique of the United States Welfare System Through the Lens of
China'sOne-ChildLaw, 14 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 142, 149-52 (2005) (discussing the history
of Chinese family planning laws).
8 See Philip P. Pan, China's One-Child Policy Now a Double Standard: Limits and
Penalties Applied Unevenly, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2002, at A01 (highlighting the differences
between rural and urban areas in the implementation of China's one-child policy).
7 Hesketh et al., supra note 85, at 1171.
8 Id.
89 Nancy E. Riley, China's Population:New Trends and Challenges, POPULATION BULL.,
June 2004, at 3, 12.
9 Hesketh et al., supra note 85, at 1171.
91 David Eimer, China Admits Women Were Forced to Have Abortions,
INDEPENDENT, Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-admits
-women-were-forced-to-have-abortions-507688.html.
8

84
85
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While there is no Chinese case law reflecting an internal legal
challenge to the one-child policy, the policy has played a central role
in a number of political asylum claims raised by Chinese nationals
seeking asylum in the United States and Canada. These judicial
discussions of the policy, particularly its manifestation in the 1980s in
allegations of forced abortions, give some insight into international
perspectives on the policy's consistency with basic principles of
human rights law. More direct criticism by international human
rights bodies has often been muted, given the very real population
challenges that face the Chinese government on the domestic front.92
Within the U.S., the "forces of America's abortion politics" tend to
obscure more moderated views.93 However, in addition to judicial
opinions, these issues have received more measured treatment by
domestic scholars writing in the United States.94
1. Chinese Claimsfor PoliticalAsylum in Canada
In a series of cases, Canadian courts have considered various
fact patterns in which Chinese nationals relied on the Chinese
government's one-child policy as a key component of their claim
for political asylum in Canada. In order to obtain political asylum,
claimants in Canada must establish a well-founded fear of persecution
based on their membership in a particular social group. 95 The
formulation of this standard, derived from the international law of
political asylum, is common across many nations.96 To meet this
standard, claimants have argued-with considerable success-that the
9 See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding
Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women: China, 32, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/6 (Aug. 25, 2006) (noting the "negative
consequences" of the one-child policy, including forced abortions and sterilization, as well as
gender imbalance in the Chinese population).
9 Ronald M. Green, U.S. Defunding of UNFPA: A Moral Analysis, 13 KENNEDY INST.
ETHICS J. 393, 393 (2003).
9 See, e.g., Love, supra note 85; Ying Chen, China's One-Child Policy and Its Violations
of Women's and Children's Rights, 22 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1 (2009); Edwin A. Winckler,
Chinese Reproductive Policy at the Turn of the Millennium: Dynamic Stability, 28 POPULATION
& DEV. REV. 379 (2002).
9s Under Canadian law, a refugee is any person who
by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of the person's nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or not having a country
of nationality . .. is outside the country of the person's former habitual residence and
is unable or, by reason of that fear, is unwilling to return to that country.
Immigration Act, R.S.C., ch. 28 (4th Supp), § 2(a) (1988).
96See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6259, 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152.
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strictures of the one-child policy define such a social group and that
when individuals are singled out for forced sterilization or abortion,
such government actions constitute persecution. In contrast, courts
have indicated that they would reject claims of persecution based on a
law of general applicability, such as the one-child policy itself.
For example, in 1993, in Cheung v. Canada,97 the Canadian
Federal Court of Appeal considered an appeal from Ting Ting
Cheung, a Chinese national seeking political asylum in Canada.
While living in southern China in the 1980s, Cheung had one son
followed by three abortions. When she became pregnant once again,
she decided against an abortion and gave birth to a daughter. Facing
discrimination against her daughter as a second child, unable to keep
her family together as a unit because of China's restrictions, and
confronting the possibility of forced sterilization, Cheung fled to
Canada and claimed political asylum.98
The Court of Appeal accepted Cheung's claim that "women in
China who have more than one child and are faced with forced
sterilization" constitute a particular social group for purposes of
the asylum law. 99 Further, while the court acknowledged that the
one-child policy is generally applicable in China and therefore could
not be described as persecution, it determined that the forced
sterilization faced by Cheung was not a law of general application.Y
Instead, wrote the court, "[tihis is a practice that affects a limited and
well-defined group of people."10' Citing provisions of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the court further noted that the serious
nature of forced sterilization would likely mean that it constitutes a
ground for persecution even if it were couched in a law of general
application. 10 2 According to the court, "[t]he practice of forcing
women to undergo sterilization is such an extreme violation of their
even though this was thought
basic human rights as to be persecutory,103
to advance the modernization of China."
More recent cases reach conclusions consistent with Cheung. For
example, in X (Re), the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board
again addressed a claim based on evidence of forced sterilization.1 04
Discounting the credibility of the claimant's evidence of coerced

[1993] 2 F.C. 314 (Can Fed. Ct.).

9 Id. at 317-18.
9 Id. at 320.
1ooM. at 322.

01
Id.
102
Id. at 324.
03

Id. at 325.
'o4X (Re), 2006 Can. LII 76153 (I.R.B.) (Can.).

THE CHILD EXCLUSION

2010]

1201

sterilization, 05 the Board went on to consider whether China's
one-child policy itself might support a claim.106 The Board concluded,
however, that China's one-child policy would not sustain a grant of
political asylum.' 07 According to the Board, context matters: "[tlhe
denial of an absolute right in China to have as many children as one
wishes can be described as reasonable social policy given the size of
the population, the strain on resources and the continuing widespread
poverty."108 Rather than persecutorial, the Board described the policy
as an "acceptable rights trade-off." 3
2. Chinese Claimsfor PoliticalAsylum in the United States
The treatment of Chinese political asylum claimants by U.S. courts
has not been as straightforward. As in Canada, an individual seeking
political asylum in the United States must generally establish a
"well-founded fear of persecution" based on political opinion,
religion, or membership in a social group. 10 However, U.S. law
incorporates an additional provision to extend political asylum to
individuals who can prove persecution under coercive family
planning policies of their home countries.'' This provision was
added to the law in 1996 specifically to aid those subjected to the
harsh practices surrounding China's one-child policy.112 Since this
change, courts have found that involuntary sterilization constitutes a
ground for political asylum.' 3
The legislative history of this new provision reveals that it was
intended by some to go far beyond forced sterilization and abortion;
for example, during the congressional debate, Representative Chris
Smith (R-NJ) remarked that the legislation would also protect
victims of "other forms of persecution for resistance" to coercive
family planning, including "forced labor, beatings and other harsh
5

1o See id. at 4-6.
106See id. at 7.
07See id. at 8.

10sId. at 6.
1 Id. at 7.
10 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987).
" See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. C, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-689 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(B) (2006)).
12See Kyle R. Rabkin, Comment, The Zero-Child Policy: How the Board of Immigration
Appeals DiscriminatesAgainst UnmarriedAsylum-Seekers Fleeing Coercive Family Planning
Measures, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 965, 967-68, 981-84 (2007) (discussing U.S. court decisions
that have limited asylum only to those couples officially married under Chinese law).
"WSee, e.g., Lin v. Gonzales, 216 F. App'x 719 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
applicant's resistance to birth control officials' efforts to confiscate and destroy family property
qualified her for asylum).
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treatment." 1 l4 Nevertheless, courts have stopped short of permitting
additional-child fines of "moderate impact" to serve as a ground for
political asylum. For example, in Lin v. Holder,"5 the court endorsed
the Board of Immigration Appeals' refusal to grant asylum when the
fines levied on a larger family, while posing a hardship, would not
rise to the level of persecution." 6
Prior to this change in the law, U.S. immigration adjudicators had
generally rejected claims based on China's population control
policies, viewing the policy as one of general applicability that would
not support a persecution claim even when the measures taken
in implementing it included forced abortion or sterilization." 7
For example, in the 1989 case of In Re Chang,"' the Board of
Immigration Appeals dismissed a claim for asylum from Mr. Chang,
a 33-year-old Chinese citizen, who argued that he would be forcibly
sterilized on return to China because he already had two children.119
Even without the change in U.S. asylum law, however, the Chang
result might be different today because of changes in China. Now,
forced sterilization and abortion are officially forbidden, making such
punishments (when they occur) more like persecution that targets
particular individuals or groups and less like an acceptable outgrowth
of a law of general applicability.120
C. African Countries
Faced with significant poverty, limited resources and
unsustainable birthrates, a number of African nations have also
adopted programs intended to limit childbirth and encourage family
planning. 12 1 Rather than focus exclusively or even primarily on
targeted incentives or disincentives, however, most of these nations
have effectively utilized educational initiatives to achieve their
4

Rabkin, supra note 112, at 987 (quoting 142 CONG. REC. Hi 1, 067, 24,796-97 (daily
ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (comments of Rep. Smith)).
"5317 F. App'x 562 (7th Cir. 2009).
6
" See id. at 563.
7
" See Rabkin, supra note 112, at 972.
18 20 I. & N. Dec. 38 (B.I.A. 1989).
11

9

" See id. at 39, 44.

12oSee, e.g., Louisa Lim, Cases of Forced Abortions Surface in China, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO, Apr. 23, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=9766870 (noting
that forced abortion and sterilization were forbidden by law beginning in 2002).
See generally U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Econ. Comm'n for Africa,
121
Comm. on Sustainable Dev., Sustainable Development Policy in Africa: Harmonizing
Population and Economic Growth in the Process of Implementing the ICPD Programme of
Action, ECA/FSSDDIPOP/CSD/01/06 (Aug. 27, 2001), available at http://www.uneca.org
/csd/Population.PDF [hereinafter ECOSOC, Policy in Africa] (reviewing population effects on
sustainability and assessing activities for the implementation of the ICPD Programme Action).
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population goals.12 2 The disincentives they employ-such as denial of
maternity leave for the nth pregnancy or denial of an additional
family allowance-are imposed on larger families across the board,
rather than targeted at particularly vulnerable sub-groups of the
national population.
The primary focus on education as a vehicle for implementing
population policy is consistent with the African Protocol on the
Rights of Women, which follows CEDAW in protecting "the right to
decide whether to have children, the number of children and the
spacing of children."123 Significantly, the African Protocol goes
further and specifically enshrines a human right to family planning
education as well. 124 Some of the approaches taken by individual
African nations to effectuate these rights are briefly summarized
below.
1. Ghana
Population control is important in Ghana, as evidenced by the fact
that its constitution requires the Ghanaian government to "maintain a
population policy consistent with the aspirations and development
needs and objectives of Ghana."l 25 Ghana's population policy goals
include significantly lowering birthrates: to five children per woman
by year 2000, to four by 2010, and to three by 2020.126 To
achieve these goals, the nation focuses its efforts on family planning,
birth control, educating the population on reproductive issues, and
improving women's rights and status in society.1 27 Involvement of
men is also an important part of the effort. 28

22

See Ross & Isaacs, supra note 29, at 272 (noting that African countries have eschewed
incentives
and simply make access to contraception free to all).
23
1 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women
in Africa, art. 14(l)(b), Sept. 13, 2000, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6, available at http:flwww
.africa-union.org/root/aulDocumentsfTreaties/Text/Protocol%20on%20the%20Rights%20of%2
OWomen.pdf
[hereinafter African Protocol]; see also CEDAW, supra note 58, art. 16(e).
24
1 See African Protocol, supra note 123, art. 14(g).
25
1 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA art. 37(4), available at http://www
.parliament.gh/chapter -six - directive-principles-state-policy.html.
26
1 See Nat'l Population Council, Gov't of Ghana, National PopulationPolicy at a Glance,
at 3 (1994) [hereinafter Ghana, National Population Policy] available at http://www.npc
.gov.ghlassets/NationalPopulationPolicyataGlance.pdf.
27
See id. at 4-8; see also Chris Benjamin, Planning Healthy Ghanaian People,
STATESMAN, Feb. 21, 2007, http://www.thestatesmanonline.com/pages/news-detail.php?newsid
=2608&section=9 (detailing the family planning strategies being implemented to achieve
population goals).
28
1 See Benjamin, supra note 127 (noting that "Ghanaian family planners have come to
realise the importance of involving men in reproductive health" because "[m]en are still the
main decision makers in most Ghanaian families and communities").
1
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In addition, however, Ghana has used policy changes and
population-wide disincentives to influence individual decision
making about reproduction. For example, the nation has raised its
minimum age of marriage from 16 to 18129 and, like a number of other
nations, limits maternity leaves to a specified number of births. 30
2. Kenya
Kenya was the first sub-Saharan country to develop a National
Family Planning Programme, launching its effort in 1967."' A large
part of Kenya's population control efforts are focused on young
people, specifically educating them about sex and reproductive health
and providing them with economic opportunities.13 2 However, the
primary focus of Kenya's population control efforts is on providing
its population with birth control.13 3 Kenya has even developed a
National Condom Policy and Strategy to complement its more
general population policy.' 34 At the same time, Kenya has also
employed a financial disincentive structure alongside educational
approaches to encourage family planning. In particular, Kenya
permits tax deductions only for the first four children in a family.13 5
3. Tunisia
Tunisia has been one of the more effective African countries at
implementing a population control strategy, as millions of Tunisian
129

Id.

30
1 See Ross & Isaacs, supra note 29, at 271; see also Gov't of Ghana, OjJicial Policy

Statement: PopulationPlanningfor National Progressand Prosperity,art. 5.20(1), reprintedin
STUD. IN FAM. PLAN., Aug. 1969, at 1, 6 (older policy statement reflecting intention to limit
maternity leave as a part of the nation's population policy).
131 See Population Reference Bureau & U.N. Population Fund, Country Profiles for
Population and Reproductive Health: Policy Developments and Indicators 2005, at 58,
available at http://www.prb.org/pdf06/2005UNFPA-CountryProfilesSubSaharanAfrica.pdf;
Robert A. Miller et al., The Situation Analysis Study of the Family Planning Programin Kenya,
FAM. PLAN. 131, 132 (1991).
22 STUD.
32
1 See Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Health, Div. of Reprod. Health, Adolescent
Reproductive Health and Development Policy Plan of Action: 2005-2015, at 7-14, available
at http://www.policyproject.com/pubs/policyplan/KEN ARHPOA%202005-15.pdf (discussing
the implementation strategies for Kenya's national planning program).
33
' See Sarah A. Rumage, Resisting the West: The Clinton Administration'sPromotion of
Abortion at the 1994 Cairo Conference and the Strength of the Islamic Response, 27 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 1, 79-80 (1996) (quoting a Kenyan pediatrician stating that "[wie are running out of
vaccine. We have no syringes, no needles, no sulfa drugs, no penicillin, yet our Family Welfare
Centers never lack birth-control supplies" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
'3See Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Health, National Condom Policy and Strategy:
2001-2005, available at http://www.policyproject.conpubs/countryreportslKenya Condom
Policy.pdf (seeking to educate the Kenyan population on the risks of HIV/AIDS, as well as to
develop an unambiguous condom policy).
135Ross & Isaacs, supra note 29, at 279.
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women have been persuaded by family-planning campaigners to have
fewer children. Specifically, the number of children per Tunisian
woman has decreased from 7.2 in the 1960s to 2.08 in 2003.136 I
addition to family-planning education, which is largely directed at
young people, Tunisia has also focused on advocating birth control
and spends large sums of money every year to dispense birth-control
devices to all parts of the country.' 37 Further, Tunisia has raised the
minimum age for marriage. 138 According to some experts, however,
the most important factor in Tunisia's population control success has
been its ability to implement social change by enabling its citizens
to use the country's declining birth rate to gain personally and
economically,13 9 as illustrated by the increase in per capita annual
income in Tunisia from $1,430 in 1993 to $2,070 in 2003, one of the
highest in Africa at the time. 14 0 Tunisia has also had success in
persuading its religious leaders to loosen their interpretation of the
Koran so as to fit with population control efforts and in integrating
women into the workforce and universities in large numbers.141
Tunisia's social policies implementing its population policy
include generally applicable financial disincentives for childbearing
as well. For example, Tunisia offers a family allowance to parents
only for the first three children in a family.14 2
IV. ETHICAL AND EFFICACIOUS STANDARDS FOR POPULATION
POLICIES

As the range of national policy responses to population pressures
indicates, population policies-from the ad-hoc child exclusion to the
national one-child policy-often raise critical moral issues about
competing rights and the proper role of government in influencing
individual reproductive choices. Judges examining real-world issues
in India, the U.S., and Canada have identified a constellation of
factors relevant to assessing whether population policies cross the line
into impermissible coercion or persecution. First, policies of general
applicability-short of policies of forced abortion or sterilization for
all-are viewed as less troubling than policies that target a particular

' 36 Gautam Naik, As Tunisia Wins PopulationBattle, Others See a Policy Model, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 8, 2003, at Al.
137Id.
138ECOSOC, Policy in Africa, supra note 121, ] 25.
39
1 Naik, supra note 136.
1e Id.
41
I

Id.

142Ross

& Isaacs, supra note 29, at 279.
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group for special hardship. 14 3 Second, relatively mild disincentives,
such as having to give up a minor elective office or moderate fines,
are viewed as less troubling than greater punishments, such as loss of
all employment or physical violation.'" Third, context matters. When
a nation's population policy identifies population control as a concern
of the highest order, more extreme approaches can be justified,
whereas a nation without such immediate policy concerns may not be
able to sustain the same justification.14 5
In addition to the practical assessments offered by judges,
philosophers and social scientists have also delved into these
questions. In a 1988 article surveying the use of disincentives and
incentives in family planning programs worldwide, Professors
John Ross and Stephen Isaacs from the Columbia School of Public
Health proposed three principles to guide nations considering
implementing such measures.14 First, they noted that "the right of
couples and individuals to determine the number and spacing of
their children"-the right set out in international human rights lawtakes precedence.147 In other words, governments seeking to infringe
on that right have the burden of establishing that failure to take
action will "threaten the well-being of the society with severe
harm to present or succeeding generations."1 4 8 The authors identify
malnutrition and starvation as candidates for such harm.14 9 Second,
the article argues that measures relying on voluntary choice should be
employed "before moving to more coercive measures."150 Third, the
authors stress that as a matter of ethics, "any measure that penalizes
children for being the nth child should be avoided."' 5 '
Other experts in search of standards have combined assessments of
efficacy with concerns about morality of coercive family planning.
For example, authors David Bloom and David Canning assert that the
link between population policy and poverty reduction is strong and
143See, e.g., Cheung v. Canada, [1993] 2 F.C. 314 (Can. Fed. Ct.); In re Chang, 20 . & N.
Dec. 38 (B.I.A. 1989).
144See, e.g., Lin v. Holder, 317 F. App'x 562 (7th Cir. 2009). Along the same lines, the
1974 United Nations Symposium on Law and Population in Tunis, Tunisia, concluded that
governments should "ensure that any benefits or services withheld or withdrawn as
disincentives in the context of family planning do not conflict with the enjoyment of basic
human rights." Luke T. Lee, Population: The Human Rights Approach, 6 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVrtL. L. & POL'Y 327, 337 (1995) (citing principles adopted by the Symposium).
145Javed v. Haryana, A.LR. 2003 S.C. 3057 (India).
146See Ross & Isaacs, supra note 29, at 280.

147Id.
148Id.

14'See id.
150Id.
151

Id.
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direct, and that approaches that emphasize empowerment and
education of women maximize the benefits of both. 152
Applying this range of potential factors to the policies discussed
above suggests some important conclusions. India and China are able
to command considerable deference for their programs precisely
because they have, as nations, been so direct and explicit in
identifying and addressing their population challenges.153 The African
nations discussed above have also developed national population
policies that provide a rationale for their population initiatives and
that reflect some agreement as to how the burdens of population
control should be shared among the residents of the country. 15 4 These
countries have made the case that the well-being of the nation rests on
controlling the country's population. In contrast, the U.S. has no
coherent overriding population policy that might serve to justify the
targeted effort reflected by the child exclusion.
Likewise, other nations have largely avoided policies that fall
hardest on an identifiable subgroup of the population. China's
one-child policy is a policy of general application, as are the
maternity leave limits and similar efforts to discourage large families
adopted in India and countries of Africa. 5 5 Haryana's limitation on
family size for elected officials does exclude a particular group in a
way that is ethically troubling given the importance of elections in a
democracy, but unlike the child exclusion analogy, the excluded
group in Haryana is not one that is associated with a particular race or
caste.' 56 Further, Haryana chose this subgroup specifically because
they are role models for the rest of the state's citizens and may
encourage more individuals to voluntarily limit their family size.i15
Promoting voluntary choices through increased access and
education are the hallmark of efforts in Kenya, Tunisia and Ghana.158
As was mentioned above, some economists argue that this approach
is by far the most effective for achieving poverty reduction in
conjunction with population control.'5 9 China, in contrast, has relied
primarily on significant disincentives, and at times even force, to
influence birthrates.160 Likewise, while the means used do not include
force, the disincentives to childbearing put forward in the child
2

15

53

See Bloom & Canning,supra note 33, at 57-59.

' See supra notes 59, 85 and accompanying text.

'4
See ECOSOC, Policy in Africa, supra note 121, 9I 20-27.
55
' See supra notes 84-85, 130 and accompanying text.
56
Javed v. Haryana, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 3057 (India).
1s Id.

supra notes 121-42 and accompanying text.
59See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
160See supra notes 85--120 and accompanying text.
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exclusion context in the United States are significant in light of the
overall income of welfare recipients, amounting to penalties between
fifteen and twenty-five percent of a family's below-subsistence

income. 16 1
Finally, the Columbia School of Public Health authors cite ethical
considerations to advocate against policies that exclude or target the
nth child.162 Limitations on maternity leave such as those in India
and Ghana certainly violate this principle, since they deny the nth
child the significant and foundational benefit of bonding with its
parents that was made available to earlier born children. 63 The child
exclusion also particularly runs afoul of this principle, since excluded
children cannot generally acquire eligibility for welfare benefits by
going to live with another family, though they may qualify in some
states if the family leaves welfare for a time and then reapplies.'6
Otherwise, they remain excluded until they attain majority, when they
leave the family's household. Indeed, in many states these children
are now simply called "cap babies" 65 as a shorthand to convey their
limited rights within the income support system.
CONCLUSION

In the absence of a federal population policy for the United States,
the child exclusion approach can only be seen as an ad-hoc response
to concerns about child poverty, tainted by overtones of class, race
and gender bias. Yet, while ad hoc, it is a response that has been
adopted by twenty-two states, with tacit approval by a federal
government that has done nothing to legislatively bar such programs
even though federal money is supporting them.
This limited comparative review teases out the aspects of the child
exclusion that are most objectionable from the perspective of
161As of 2005, the monthly maximum benefit for a family of three in New Jersey was
$424. See National Center for Children in Poverty, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) Cash Assistance: New Jersey, http://www.nccp.org/profiles/NJ profile_36.html (last
visited Aug. 31, 2010). The benefits denied amounted to $102 for a second child and $64 for a
third child. C.K. v. N.J. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 179 (3d Cir. 1996).
62
1 See Ross & Isaacs, supra note 29, at 280.
63
' See supra notes 84, 130 and accompanying text.
'1See Rebecca L. Hegar & Maria Scannapieco, Grandma's Babies: The Problem of
Welfare Eligibility for Children Raised by Relatives, J. SOC. & Soc. WELFARE, Sept. 2000, at
153, 158-64 (discussing the historical limitations imposed on children receiving benefits who
live outside of the family); Smith, supra note 17, at 166 (noting that some states will suspend
cap policies for families that leave welfare for a period of time).
165LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM REV. & INVESTIGATION COMM., CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
STAFF BRIEFING: CONNECTICUT'S WELFARE REFORM INITIATIVE 40 (2006), available at

http://www.cga.ct.gov/2006/pridata/Studies/PDF/WelfareReform.Briefing.PDF (referring to
excluded children as "cap babies," and noting that over 1800 "cap babies" were bom within the
first year and a half of the program).
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population policy and human rights: its focus on subsistence benefits,
its use of disincentives rather than incentives, and its targeting of a
marginalized, disproportionately minority population. As discussed
above, other nations facing serious population issues have developed
alternative approaches to influencing family decisions that avoid this
confluence of suspect factors, that better respect individual autonomy,
and that do not raise these human rights flags. The Chinese one-child
policy, for example, is a policy of general application. Likewise,
the policy of limiting childbirth of elected officials, adopted by the
Indian state of Haryana, avoids targeting marginalized groups and
does not cut off basic needs. And in African nations seeking to
influence family size, policies of general applicability give priority to
educational outreach as a means to influence population choices.
The child exclusion, in contrast, combines many of the most
suspect elements of the population policies examined here. The
United States' failure to take alternative steps to achieve its
population goals in lieu of permitting state level child exclusion
policies raises serious questions under international human rights law.

